We present a unifying semantical and proof-theoretical framework for investigating depth-bounded approximations to Boolean Logic, namely approximations in which the number of nested applications of a single structural rule, representing the classical Principle of Bivalence, is bounded above by a fixed natural number. These approximations provide a hierarchy of tractable logical systems that indefinitely converge to classical propositional logic. The framework we present here brings to light a general approach to logical inference that is quite different from the standard Gentzen-style approaches, while preserving some of their nice proof-theoretical properties, and is common to several proof systems and algorithms, such as KE, KI and Stålmarck's method.
Introduction
Logic is informationally trivial and, yet, computationally hard. This is one of the most baffling paradoxes arising from the traditional account of logical consequence. Triviality stems from the widely accepted characterization of deductive inference as ''tautological'', in the sense of being uninformative or non-ampliative: the information carried by the conclusion is (in some sense) contained in the information carried by the premisses. Computational hardness stems from the well-known results showing that most interesting logics are either undecidable or likely to be intractable. In classical quantification theory, the tension between the alleged triviality of logical consequence and the established fact that it admits of no mechanical decision procedure was described by Jaakko Hintikka as a true ''scandal of deduction'' [38] . 1 In Hintikka's view, the scandal was confined to first-order logic: by virtue of its decidability, Boolean Logic was prima facie consistent with the traditional view that logical consequence is uninformative. However, Cook's theorem [14] -according to which Boolean logic is tractable if and only if P = N P -strongly suggests that even in the innocuous-looking domain of Boolean languages, logical consequence is probably far from being uninformative.
is a logical consequence of the data. However, this is clearly not the case when the logic in question lacks a feasible decisionMore specifically, in Section 2.2 we present a modular semantics for arbitrary n-ary operators based on partial valuations. 5 The resulting consequence relation, although being a proper subsystem of Boolean Logic, is still a logic in Tarski's sense. The modular semantics is subsequently used, in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, to characterize a set of introduction and elimination rules (or intelim rules, for short) for arbitrary operators that satisfy a form of the inversion principle 6 and define a natural deduction system with no discharge rules. Section 2.5 shows that every intelim proof can be turned into one that enjoys the subformula property with no increase in the size of the proof. Section 2.6 shows that the pure intelim logic is tractable. Next, in Sections 2.8 and 2.9 we first show, in the spirit of [36] , that the pure intelim logic is not characterized by any finite valuation system. We also show that the modular semantics of Section 2.2 is equivalent to a certain kind of non-deterministic valuation system that was first proposed by Crawford and Etherington [15] to provide semantics for unit resolution. This result strongly suggests that the intelim system can be seen as a generalization of unit resolution to an unrestricted language with arbitrary operators. In Section 3.1 we re-interpret the Principle of Bivalence as a principle allowing for the manipulation of ''virtual information'', i.e., information that may not belong to the current information state of a given reasoning agent, but whose consideration is essential to carry out some classical inferences. Finally, in Sections 3.2-3.6 we investigate the tractable logical systems that arise from bounding the search space and the manipulation of virtual information in a variety of ways.
0-depth Boolean logics

Preliminaries
Let L be an arbitrary propositional language with a finite number of logical operators of fixed finite arity. Let F (L) be the set of well-formed formulas of L. We use p, q, r, possibly with subscripts, as metalinguistic variables for atomic L-formulas, A, B, C , etc., possibly with subscripts, for arbitrary L-formulas, and Γ , ∆, Λ, possibly with subscripts, for sets of L-formulas.
In the context of this paper we shall abuse standard terminology and call consequence relation on a language L any relation |= between sets of formulas of L and formulas of L satisfying the following conditions:
A |= A (Reflexivity)
A Tarski consequence relation on L is a consequence relation on L in the standard sense, i.e., one satisfying the following additional condition:
Γ |= A and Γ ∪ {A} |= B =⇒ Γ |= B.
(Cut)
A substitution is a mapping σ : F (L) → F (L) such that for every n-ary operator ⋆, σ (⋆(P 1 , . . . , P n )) =  ⋆(σ (P 1 ), . . . , σ (P n )) if n > 0 ⋆ if n = 0.
To economize on parentheses we shall simply write σ A instead of σ (A). We shall also write σ ∆, with ∆ a set of formulas, for {σ A|A ∈ ∆}. A Tarskian propositional logic is a pair L = ⟨L, |= L ⟩, where L is a propositional language and |= L is a Tarski consequence relation on L satisfying the following additional condition:
If L is a propositional language with logical operators ⋆ 1 , . . . , ⋆ n , a valuation system 7 V for L is a structure ⟨V , D, f 1 , . . . , f n ⟩, where:
1. V is a set with at least two elements; 2. D is a proper non-empty subset of V ;
3. for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, f i is a mapping of V a i to V , where a i is the arity of ⋆ i .
A valuation system is finite, if V contains a finite number of elements. A Boolean valuation system is one in which V = {0, 1} and D = {1}. An assignment relative to a valuation system V for L is a mapping of the atomic formulas of L to V . Each assignment φ induces the (total) valuation v φ over V defined as follows:
5 Some of the ideas in this section have been inspired by David Makinson (private communication). This modular semantics is related, but not equivalent, to the semantics proposed in [23] for the language with the four standard Boolean operators. In particular, the modular semantics does not validate the ''mingle rules'' of [23] and so provides a sharp characterization of the pure intelim system. 6 The Inversion Principle essentially says that no information can be obtained from applying an elimination rule to a sentence A that would not have already been available if A had been obtained by means of an introduction rule. It plays a crucial role in the admissibility of a set of natural deduction rules as definitions of the logical operators. For the historical background and a discussion see [46] . 7 Here we follow the terminology of [27] . In many contexts a valuation system is also called ''matrix''.
• v φ (p) = φ(p) for all atomic p, • v φ (⋆ i (A 1 , . . . , A a i )) = f i (v φ (A 1 ), . . . , v φ (A a i )).
For every set Γ of L-formulas and every L-formula A, Γ |= V A (Γ entails A in V ) if and only if, for every assignment φ, v φ (A) ∈ D whenever v φ (B) ∈ D for all B ∈ Γ . Given a propositional logic L = ⟨L, |= L ⟩ and a valuation system V for L, we say that
• V is faithful to L if, and only if, for every Γ and A, Γ |= L A implies Γ |= V A;
• V is characteristic for L if, and only if, V is faithful to L and, for all Γ and A, Γ |= V A implies Γ |= L A.
An approximation system for L is a triple A = ⟨P, ≼, {R α } α∈P ⟩, where (P, ≼) is a directed set, called the parameter set, and {R α } α∈P is a family of consequence relations on L such that:
• α ≺ β implies R α ⊂ R β ,
• for each α ∈ P, R α is decidable in polynomial time,
We shall call L the limiting logic of the approximation system A . Each relation R α is an approximation of L. Clearly, approximation systems are of practical and theoretical interest whenever the limiting logic is known or conjectured to be intractable. In the context of this paper we are concerned with approximation systems where the limiting logic is classical propositional logic over some arbitrary propositional language L.
Observe that there is no a priori reason for a set of logical operators that is functionally complete for Boolean logic to be functionally complete also for its approximations. So, we shall define approximation systems for any logic L = ⟨L, |= L ⟩, where L is an arbitrary language and |= L is a Boolean consequence relation, i.e., a consequence relation on L characterized by the Boolean valuation system for L. To simplify our treatment we shall assume that L includes the four standard Boolean operators associated with the usual Boolean functions, but the results presented in this paper are independent of this assumption.
Modular semantics
The main aim of this section is to define a basic notion of ''information state'' and a corresponding notion of 0-depth consequence. 8 This will be done in Definitions 2.10 and 2.13 at the end of a longish sequence of preliminary steps.
In what follows we shall restrict our attention to non-degenerate Boolean operators, i.e., to n-ary operators ⋆ such that f ⋆ (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = 1 and f ⋆ (y 1 , . . . , y n ) = 0 for some n-tuples x 1 , . . . , x n and y 1 , . . . , y n of values in {0, 1}.
Definition 2.1. For every formula A:
• a subformula of A is defined inductively as follows:
• a proper subformula of A is any subformula of A that is different from A;
• an immediate subformula of A is any proper subformula of A that is not a proper subformula of any proper subformula of A.
We write v(A) = ⊥ whenever v is undefined for A. Thus, a partial valuation can be seen as a total mapping from F (L) to {0, 1, ⊥} where ⊥ is treated as a third value. For the sake of easier exposition, in the sequel we shall use the three-valued representation.
Partial valuations can be interpreted in a variety of ways. According to one interpretation v(A) = 1 means intuitively that A is true, v(A) = 0 that A is false and v(A) = ⊥ that A is neither-true-nor-false. According to another, which is the one we shall adopt in this paper, a partial valuation v represents the information held by a given agent a about the truth or falsity of sentences; v(A) = 1 means ''a holds the information that A is true'' , v(A) = 0 means ''a holds the information that A is false'' and v(A) = ⊥ means ''a holds no information about the truth or falsity of A''. 9 We take the three values as partially ordered by the relation ≼ such that x ≼ y (''x is less defined than, or equal to, y'') if, and only if, x = ⊥ or x = y for x, y ∈ {0, 1, ⊥}. Partial valuations are, in turn, partially ordered by the usual approximation relation ⊑ defined as follows: v ⊑ w (read: ''v approximates w'' or ''w refines v'') if and only if v(A) ≼ w(A) for all A. The set of all partial valuations partially ordered by ⊑ forms a meet-semilattice with a bottom element consisting of the partial valuation that takes the undefined value for all formulas. We denote by v ⊓ w the meet of the partial valuations v and w.
Our aim, now, is to define an ''information state'' as a special kind of partial valuation that (i) is ''locally'' compatible with the classical interpretation of the logical operators and (ii) is closed under a most basic kind of implicit information.
First, we need to pick out, from the set of all partial valuations, those that agree with the classical truth-tables. In the presence of the ''undefined'' value ⊥, this can be done in a variety of ways. Here we investigate a modular approach, in which agreement is checked ''locally'' with respect to the main logical operator of a formula, ignoring the other operators that may occur in it, that is, treating the operands as if they were (distinct) atomic formulas.
3. An L-module is a set consisting of a non-atomic L-formula, called the top formula of the module, and of its immediate subformulas, called the secondary formulas of the module.
We shall denote by Mod(A) the unique L-module whose top formula is A.
Definition 2.4.
A valuation module is any mapping α : Mod(A) → {0, 1, ⊥}, where A is some non-atomic formula. Given a partial valuation v, we say that α is a module of
By extension, we shall call top formula of α the top formula of dom(α), and main operator of α the main operator of the top formula of α.
For each non-atomic formula B = ⋆(A 1 , . . . , A n ) and each i = 1, . . . , n + 1, let
In the sequel we shall use the boldface letters x, y, z, etc. to denote finite vectors with values in {0, 1, ⊥}. 
We say that a vector x ∈ {0, 1, ⊥} n approximates a vector y ∈ {0, 1, ⊥} n , and write x ≼ y if, and only if, x i ≼ y i for all i = 1, . . . , n. Notice that, for every fixed n, the set of all vectors in {0, 1, ⊥} n partially ordered by ≼ is a meet semilattice. We denote by x ∧ y the meet of x and y. For each n-ary operator ⋆, let us denote by A ⋆ the set of all vectors in {0, 1, ⊥} n+1 that approximate some vector in the graph of f ⋆ (i.e., the Boolean function associated with ⋆ by the valuation system that characterizes the limiting logic L), namely the set {x | ∃y(x ≼ y and y ∈ f ⋆ )}, where by ''y ∈ f ⋆ '' we mean that y belongs to the graph of f ⋆ . Let M ⋆ denote the set of all valuation modules α such that the top formula of α is a ⋆-formula. Thus an admissible partial valuation is one that conveys partial information about the sentences of the given language in a way that agrees with the Boolean truth-tables for the logical operators in the modular sense specified above: the value assigned to each formula A is compatible with those assigned to its immediate subformulas according to the truth-table for the main logical operator of A. Now, we want to specify what it means that a certain piece of information, specifying that a given sentence is true or false, is ''implicitly contained'' in the information that is explicitly conveyed by a partial valuation v. Let us denote by x[i := z], for z ∈ {0, 1, ⊥} the vector y such that y i = z and y j = x j for all j ̸ = i. Definition 2.7. For every n-ary operator ⋆, a vector x ∈ A ⋆ is stable in A ⋆ if, and only if, for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1,
In other words, a stable approximation of a vector in the graph of f ⋆ is a vector such that each of its ''undefined'' components may indifferently take, in some better approximation, either of the two defined values 0 and 1. On the other hand, a vector in A ⋆ is unstable whenever, for some of its undefined components, one of the two possible defined values is ruled out by the truth-table for ⋆, and so the other one is uniquely determined as the only possible defined value that this component can take. 
. Since x and y are both stable, z ≼ x and z ≼ y, it follows that either x i and y i are both equal to 0 or they are both equal to 1. Hence z i = 0 or z i = 1, against the assumption. This is sufficient to ensure that, for every α, the set of all informationally closed β such that α ⊑ β has a minimum element. Therefore, for every valuation v, the set of informationally closed valuations w such that v ⊑ w also has a minimum element. Definition 2.10. A partial valuation is an information state if it is informationally closed. Examples 2.11. According to the above definition, the module α described by the following table:
is admissible, because its value vector → α = (1, ⊥, 0) approximates the vector (1, 0, 0) which is in the graph of f ∧ (since f ∧ (1, 0) = 0). On the other hand, the following modules:
are not admissible, because (0, ⊥, 1) does not approximate any vector in the graph of f ∧ and (1, ⊥, 0) does not approximate any vector in the graph of f ∨ .
The following modules [6, 7] , it has no ''tautologies'', i.e., for no formula A, it holds true that ∅ |= 0 A. To see this, it is sufficient to observe that the partial valuation v such that v(A) = ⊥ for all A is, according to our definition, an information state -we could call it the null information state. Hence, there is no formula that is verified by all information states; in particular no formula is verified by the null information state.
Boolean natural deduction: intelim sequences
Signed formulas of L are expressions of the form T A or F A, where A is a formula of L. The intuitive interpretation of such signed formulas is, respectively, ''A is true'' and ''A is false''. By a conjugate of a signed formula, we mean the result of replacing T with F or F with T , so that the conjugate of T A is F A and the conjugate of F A is T A. We shall use '' , , ' 
is a minimal 10 vector in A ⋆ satisfying the following condition for all y ∈ f ⋆ :
Observe that, according to the above definition of the vector x, x n+1 is always equal to ⊥. Thus, x is unstable and y n+1 = z n+1 for every stable y, z ∈ A ⋆ such that x ≼ y and x ≼ z. Definition 2.17. For every n-ary operator ⋆, with n > 0, ⟨⟨S 1 ψ 1 , . . . , S k ψ k ⟩, S 0 ϕ⟩ is a Boolean elimination rule for ⋆ if, and only if, 1. ψ 1 has the form ⋆(θ 1 , . . . , θ n ), where θ 1 , . . . , θ n are distinct atomic formula schemes; 2. ϕ, ψ 2 , . . . , ψ k , k ≤ n, are distinct elements of {θ 1 , . . . , θ n }; 3. the vector x ∈ {0, 1, ⊥} n+1 such that, for all i = 1, . . . , n + 1,
is a minimal vector in A ⋆ satisfying the following condition for all y ∈ f ⋆ :
where j is the unique element of {1, . . . , n} such that ϕ = π j (ψ 1 ) = θ j .
The signed formula scheme S 1 ψ 1 is called the major premiss scheme of the rule, while the signed formula schemes S i ψ i , for i = 2, . . . , k are called minor premiss schemes.
Observe that, according to the above definition of the vector x, x n+1 = val(S 1 ). Moreover, if ϕ = θ j , x j = ⊥, otherwise x would not satisfy the condition in Clause 3. Thus, x is unstable and y j = z j for every stable y, z ∈ A ⋆ such that x ≼ y and x ≼ z.
By Boolean intelim rules for L we mean the collection of all Boolean introduction and elimination rules for the logical operators of L. An intelim rule ⟨⟨S 1 ψ 1 , . . . , S k ψ k ⟩, S 0 ϕ⟩ is usually represented as: For every intelim rule R = ⟨⟨S 1 ψ 1 , . . . , S k ψ k ⟩, S 0 ϕ⟩, we say that a signed formula S 0 A follows from a set of signed formulas by an application of R if there is a substitution ρ of schematic letters with L-formulas such that (i) = {S 1 ρ(ψ 1 ), . . . , S k ρ(ψ k )}, and (ii) ρ(ϕ) = A. The signed formulas in and S 0 A are, respectively, the premisses and the conclusion of the rule application. If R is an elimination rule, S 1 ρ(ψ 1 ) is the major premiss of the rule application. Table 1 Intelim rules for the four standard Boolean operators.
Table 2
Intelim rules for exclusive or (⊕), Peirce's arrow (↓), Sheffer's stroke (|).
In the sequel, we shall use X , Y , Z , possibly with subscripts, as metalinguistic variables ranging over signed formulas of L. Moreover, X will denote the conjugate of X .
Definition 2.18. Given any set of signed formulas, an intelim sequence for
is a finite sequence X 1 , . . . , X n of signed formulas such that for every For the sake of easier notation, we shall use the same symbol ''⊢ IE '' for the intelim-deducibility relation, no matter whether it refers to signed or unsigned formulas; so, ''Γ ⊢ IE A'' means that the unsigned formula A is intelim deducible from the set Γ of unsigned formulas, and '' ⊢ IE X '' means that the signed formula X is intelim deducible from the set of signed formulas. Proof. Left to the reader.
Proposition 2.25. If Γ is intelim-inconsistent, then Γ ⊢ IE A for every formula A.
Proof. Let A be an arbitrary formula and suppose Γ is intelim-inconsistent. Then there is a closed intelim sequence for
{T B | B ∈ Γ } ⊢ IE T C and {T B | B ∈ Γ } ⊢ IE F C for some formula C . By T ∨-I 1 (see Table 1 ) T C ⊢ IE T C ∨ A, and by
Soundness and completeness of intelim sequences
Given the close correspondence between the proof-theoretical notions of the previous section and the semantical notions of Section 2.2, soundness and completeness of ⊢ IE with respect to |= 0 are particularly straightforward.
Definition 2.26.
A set of signed formulas is intelim saturated if it satisfies the following conditions:
1. for no formula A, T A and F A are both in ; 2. for every signed formula X , if X follows from some subset of by an application of an intelim rule, then X ∈ .
Proposition 2.27. A partial valuation v is an information state if and only if the set
Proof. Suppose v is an information state and that there is an intelim rule
11 Since α is a module of v and v is informationally closed, by Definition 2.8 α is informationally closed and → α is a stable element of A ⋆ , where ⋆ is the main operator of α. Let n ≥ k be the arity of ⋆ and consider the vector x ∈ {0, 1, ⊥} n+1 such that, for all i = 1, . . . , n + 1,
Since S 0 A follows from by an application of R, then there is a substitution ρ of schematic letters with L-formulas such that
and so:
for all i such that x i ̸ = ⊥, and so x ≼ → α . By Definition 2.16, for every stable y ∈ A ⋆ such that x ≼ y,
Now, → α is a stable element of A ⋆ and so
The argument is similar for the case in which R is an elimination rule.
We have so shown that v is closed under all the intelim rules. Moreover, since v is a function, v satisfies also the condition that for no A, T A and F A are both in . Therefore, v is intelim saturated.
This concludes the proof of the ''only-if'' direction, i.e., that is intelim saturated whenever v is an information state. The proof of the converse is left to the reader.
Proposition 2.28. A set of signed formulas is closed under the intelim rules if and only if is closed under intelim-deducibility,
i.e., X ∈ whenever ⊢ IE X for some ⊆ . Suppose now that T A belongs to every intelim saturated set that includes {T B | B ∈ Γ }. By Proposition 2.27, for every information state v that verifies all the formulas in Γ , the set = {T C |v(C) = 1} ∪ {F C |v(C) = 0} is intelim saturated and includes {T B | B ∈ Γ }. Therefore, T A ∈ and v(A) = 1.
Proposition 2.30 (Soundness and Completeness
By Proposition 2.28, the set {S C | ⊢ IE S C } is included in every intelim saturated set that includes . We distinguish two cases. 
Subformula property
While elimination rules preserve the subformula property -the conclusion of their application is always a signed subformula of the major premiss -introduction rules do not. So, it is important, both for theoretical and practical reasons, to show that the search for intelim proofs or refutations can be restricted, without any loss, to sequences involving only signed subformulas of the assumptions or, in the case of proofs, of the signed formula to be proved. In this section we show that the intelim logic satisfies the subformula property in the following form:
1. If is intelim inconsistent, there is an intelim refutation that involves only signed subformulas of the signed formulas in ; 2. If is intelim consistent and X is intelim provable from , there is an intelim proof that involves only signed subformulas of the signed formulas in ∪ {X}.
This version of the subformula property is sufficient for all practical purposes. For, if we are trying to refute we know that the search space can be restricted to intelim sequences that contain only signed subformulas of the signed formulas in :
is intelim inconsistent if and only if one of these sequences is closed. On the other hand, if we are trying to prove X from the search space can be restricted to intelim sequences that contain only signed subformulas of the signed formulas in ∪ {X}: ⊢ IE X if and only if one of these sequences is closed or contains X .
Definition 2.31. Given two sets and of signed formulas, we say that and clash if there is a formula A such that S A ∈ and S A ∈ .
Lemma 2.32 (Inversion Principle). If a conclusion X follows from ∪ {Y } by an application of an elimination rule, with Y as major premiss, then X belongs to every such that (i) Y follows from by an application of an introduction rule, and (ii) does not clash with .
Proof. Let , be sets of signed formulas that do not clash. Let us assume that X follows from ∪ {Y } by an application of an elimination rule, with Y as major premiss, and that Y follows from by an application of an introduction rule. We want
Consider the vectors x, y ∈ {0, 1, ⊥} n+1 such x n+1 = y n+1 = ⊥ and for i = 1, . . . , n:
Observe that the join x∨y (with respect to the ≼ ordering) exists whenever and do not clash. Since Y = S 1 ⋆(B 1 , . . . , B n ) results from by an application of an introduction rule, it follows from clause (3) of Definition 2.16 that for all z ∈ f ⋆ ,
and so
On the other hand, since X = S 2 B j results from ∪ {Y } by an application of an elimination rule, it follows from (6) and clause (3) of Definition 2.17 that, for all z ∈ f ⋆ ,
Now, for every n-ary operator ⋆, every vector whose n + 1 component is undefined belongs to A ⋆ . So, given that x n+1 = y n+1 = ⊥, if x j = y j = ⊥, f ⋆ must contain refinements u, w of x ∨ y such that u j = 1 and w j = 0. Since z j takes a fixed value in {0, 1} for all refinements z of x ∨ y in f ⋆ , it follows that either x j or y j must already be equal to this fixed value. Notice that, by Definition 2.17, neither S 2 B j nor its conjugate are in and, therefore, x j = ⊥. So y j is already defined and equal to z j for every z ∈ f ⋆ , that is, y j = val(S 2 ). Hence, S 2 B j ∈ .
Lemma 2.33. If Y follows from by an application of an introduction rule and Y follows from also by an application of an introduction rule, then and clash.
Proof. Left to the reader.
Let us use the symbols a, b, c, etc. to denote finite sequences of signed formulas. Given a sequence a = X 1 , . . . , X n of signed formulas, a subsequence of a is any sequence b such that b = X a(1) , . . . , X a(k) , for some k ≤ n and strictly increasing a : {1, . . . , k} → {1, . . . , n}. If k < n we say that b is a proper subsequence of a. Definition 2.34. We say that a sequence a of signed formulas is a non-redundant intelim proof of X from (non-redundant intelim refutation of ) if a is an intelim proof of X from (an intelim refutation of ) and there is no proper subsequence of a that is an intelim proof of X from (an intelim refutation of ). Definition 2.35. Given an intelim sequence a for , a signed formula X occurring in a is a detour in a if X occurs in a both as conclusion of an introduction and as major premiss of an elimination. Definition 2.36. We say that an intelim proof a of X from is regular if for no A, T A and F A both occur in a as premisses of a rule application. 1. Y occurs in a as the conclusion of an introduction with premisses U 1 , . . . , U k 2. Z occurs in a as the conclusion of an elimination with Y as major premiss and V 1 , . . . , V m as minor premisses.
By Lemma 2.32, either (i) the conclusion Z of the elimination is already contained in {U 1 , . . . , U k }, or (ii) {V 1 , . . . , V m } clashes with {U 1 , . . . , U k }, that is, some minor premiss of the elimination is the conjugate of some of the premisses of the introduction and so, for some A, both T A and F A occur in a before Z . It follows that a is a redundant refutation of against the assumption that a was non-redundant.
As for (2), let a be a non-redundant regular proof of X from . By the same argument used above, it can be easily checked that if a contains a detour, a is either redundant or irregular, since it contains a pair of conjugate formulas that are both used as premisses of a rule application. This concludes the proof of the lemma. Definition 2.38. An intelim proof of X from is analytic if every signed formula occurring in it is a signed subformula of X or of some signed formula in . A refutation of is analytic if every signed formula occurring in it is a signed subformula of some signed formula in . Proposition 2.39. For all X , all and all intelim sequences a for ,
if a is a non-redundant intelim refutation of , then a is an analytic intelim refutation of ; 2. if a is a non-redundant and regular intelim proof of X from , then a is an analytic intelim proof of X from of ;
Proof. Let us define the logical degree of a signed formula S A as the number of occurrences of logical operators in A. Let a be a non-redundant intelim refutation of . Let be the set of all signed formulas in a that are not signed subformulas of any of the signed formulas in . Suppose a is non-analytic, that is, ̸ = ∅ and let Y be an element of of maximal logical degree. Now, Y cannot be in and cannot be obtained from previous signed formulas by an application of an elimination rule, otherwise the major premiss of this application would also be in and would have a strictly greater logical degree than that of Y . So, Y must result from an application of an introduction rule.
Since a is non-redundant, Y must be used in it, either to close the sequence or as premiss of an intelim rule. In the first case, Y (the conjugate of Y ) must also occur in a and, by the same argument just used for Y , it can only be the conclusion of an introduction. It is not difficult to see, from the definition of introduction rule, that in such a case one of the premisses of the introduction of Y must be the conjugate of one of the premisses of the introduction of Y . So, there is a closed proper subsequence of a that is still an intelim refutation of , against the assumption that a is non-redundant. In the second case, there must be a signed formula V in a such that V is the conclusion of some rule application with Y as one of the premisses. From the assumption that Y has maximal logical degree among the signed formulas in , it follows that V must be the conclusion of an elimination with Y as major premiss. For, if V were the conclusion of an introduction, V would be a signed formula in with logical degree strictly greater than that of Y . Similarly, if V were the conclusion of an elimination with Y as minor premiss, the major premiss of this elimination would be a signed formula in with logical degree strictly greater than that of Y . Hence, Y is at the same time the conclusion of an introduction and the major premiss of an elimination, that is, Y is a detour. Then, by Lemma 2.37(1), a is redundant, against the assumption. This concludes the proof of claim 1. The argument for claim 2 is essentially the same, except that: (i) a is a non-redundant regular intelim proof of X from , (ii) is the set of signed formulas in a that are not signed subformulas of signed formulas in ∪ {X}, (iii) under the assumption that the intelim proof is regular Y can only be a detour in a and therefore, by Lemma 2.37(2), a must be redundant against the assumption that it is not.
Let us define the size of a sequence a of signed formulas, denoted by |a|, as the total number of occurrences of symbols in a. Proof. The corollary follows immediately from Proposition 2.39 and from the fact that if there is an intelim refutation a of (regular intelim proof of X from ), then there always exists a subsequence a ′ of a such that a ′ is a non-redundant intelim refutation of (non-redundant and regular intelim proof of X from ). Clearly the size of a ′ is less than or equal to the size of a.
As the above proposition suggests, there are and X such that X is intelim deducible from by means of an irregular intelim proof, but there is no analytic intelim proof of X from . A simple example is the well-known proof of T B from T A and T ¬A:
However, the existence of an irregular intelim proof of X from Γ means that Γ is intelim inconsistent and, by Claim 1 of Corollary 2.40, in this case there is always an analytic intelim refutation of .
It is interesting to observe that, by Corollary 2.40, analytic intelim proofs or refutations are uniformly shorter than nonanalytic ones. This property can be contrasted with the well-known fact that analytic proofs or refutations in full classical propositional logic may be exponentially longer than non-analytic ones.
Finally, we observe that Corollary 2.40 and Proposition 2.30, taken together, imply that intelim deducibility and refutability can be characterized in terms of informationally closed valuations whose domain is not the whole of F (L), but is restricted to the relevant subformulas.
Given a set Γ of formulas, let sub(Γ ) denote the set of all subformulas of the formulas in Γ .
A special case of an L-domain is the set F (L) consisting of all the formulas of the language L. We can then consider local partial valuations, namely mappings v : ∆ → {0, 1, ⊥} where ∆ is an L-domain that is properly included in F (L) and extend all the definitions in Section 2.2 in the obvious way. In particular: 
Tractability of 0-depth Boolean logics
Corollary 2.40 guarantees the existence of a decision procedure for the intelim logic by delimiting the space of the signed formulas that have to be taken into consideration as possible conclusions of the introduction rules. In this section we show that the decision problem for the intelim logic is tractable. 
by an application of an intelim rule.
The initial intelim graph for Γ based on ∆ is the intelim graph for Γ based on ∆ such that λ(A) = ⊥ for all A / ∈ ∆. An intelim graph for Γ is completed if it satisfies also the converse of (2).
Simple decision procedures for intelim refutability and deducibility are illustrated in Algorithms 2.1-2.2, and consist in building the initial intelim graph for the set of formulas that are mentioned in the specification of the problem (just the assumptions for refutation problems, the assumptions plus the conclusion for deduction problems) and turning it into a complete intelim graph by saturating it in accordance with the intelim rules. Both algorithms call the subroutine Expand described in Algorithm 2.3. The latter, in turn, calls the subroutine Apply_Intelim described in Algorithm 2.4.
The symbol ''⊤'' stands for the ''inconsistent labeling function''. This is only a way of speaking to mean that there is no labeling function consistent with the intelim rules.
The correctness of both decision procedures follows from the fact that they return true if and only if the set {T A | λ(A) = 1} ∪ {F A | λ(A) = 1} is intelim saturated. We omit a detailed proof and just briefly discuss their complexity.
For each x ∈ {0, 1}, let sign(x) = T iff x = 1 and sign(x) = F iff x = 0. Recall also that, for S ∈ {T , F }, val(S) = 1 iff S = T and val(S) = 0 iff S = F . Let |A| denote the size of the formula A, i.e., the total number of occurrences of symbols in A. The size of a finite set Γ of formulas is defined as  A∈Γ |A| and denoted by |Γ |. The input for Algorithm 2.1 is a list of all the formulas in Γ , while the input for Algorithm 2.2 is a pair consisting of a list of all the formulas in Γ and the formula A. Let n be the total size of the input, namely O(|Γ |) pop a formula A from formula_stack
4:
Apply_Intelim(A, ⟨G, λ⟩)
5: end while
Notice that:
the number of nodes in the subformula graph G (line 1 of both decision procedures) is O(n);
2. the cost of building the initial labeled subformula graph ⟨G, λ⟩ is O(n 2 ); 3. the while loop in the Expand subroutine (Algorithm 2.3) is executed at most as many times as there are nodes in G, namely O(n) times; (here the key observation is that in Line 3 the formula A can be safely removed from formula_stack, that is each formula in formula_stack needs to be visited at most once;) 4. the essential cost of each run of the while loop consists in the cost of the Apply_Intelim subroutine (Algorithm 2.4);
for each formula A in G there are at most O(n) G-modules containing A (line 1 of Algorithm 2.4);
6. the maximum number of nodes in a G-module is a + 1, where a is the maximum arity of a logical operator in L; 7. the cost of each run of the forall loop in the Apply_Intelim subroutine is O(a).
It follows from (1)-(7) that:
Proposition 2.48. Whether or not A is intelim deducible from Γ (Γ is intelim refutable) can be decided in time O(n
2 ), where n = |Γ ∪ {A}| (n = |Γ | ).
Expressive completeness
Given a logic L = ⟨L, |= L ⟩, we say that an n-ary logical operator • of L is definable in terms of other logical operators 
Algorithm 2.4 Apply_Intelim(A, ⟨G, λ⟩)
1: for all the G-modules M containing A do 2: let B be the top formula of M; 3: consider the set = {T C | C ∈ M and λ(C) = 1} ∪ {F C | C ∈ M and λ(C) = 0}; 4: if contains all the premisses for an application of an introduction rule with conclusion S B then 5: if λ(B) = |1 − val(S)| then 6: return λ = ⊤
7:
else if λ(B) = ⊥ then 8: set λ(B) := val(S) and push B into formula_stack;
9:
else 10: do nothing; 11: end if 12: else 13: for all C ∈ M do 14: if contains all the premisses for an application of an elimination rule with major premiss sign(λ(B)) B and conclusion S C , then 15: if λ(C) = |1 − val(S)| then 16: return λ = ⊤
17:
else if λ(C) = ⊥ then 18: set λ(C) := val(S) and push C into formula_stack;
19:
else 20: do nothing; 21: end if 22: end if 23: end for 24: end if 25 This situation implies that, in general, the 0-depth consequence relation defines different logics for different choices of the logical operators in the language L, since there is no finite set of logical operators that is expressively complete.
Lack of a finite valuation system for 0-depth Boolean Logics
We now show that the modular semantics described in Section 2.2 is not equivalent to any standard finitely-valued semantics.
Proposition 2.49.
There is no finite valuation system characteristic for ⟨L, |= 0 ⟩.
Proof. Let V be a valuation system such that V contains n elements. Given n + 2 distinct atomic formulas p 0 , . . . , p n+1 of L, let Γ = {p i → p i+1 } 0≤i≤n and let
For example, when n = 3,
Now, let φ be an assignments such that v φ (B) ∈ D for all B ∈ Γ . Observe that, since there are only n distinct elements in V , then for some j, 2 ≤ j ≤ n + 1, and some i, 0 ≤ i ≤ j − 2, it must be the case that φ(p j ) = φ(p i+1 ) and, therefore,
In the above example for n = 3, it is impossible that
are all simultaneously true inequalities and, therefore, one of the disjuncts in C must receive the same designated value as one of the formulas in Γ . Hence, since V is characteristic for ⟨L, |= 0 ⟩ and A |= 0 A ∨ B for all A, B ∈ L, it follows that v φ (C) ∈ D and so Γ |= V C . However, it is not difficult to check that, by the decision procedure for intelim deducibility, Γ IE C and therefore, by the completeness of ⊢ IE , Γ ̸ |= 0 C .
3-valued non-deterministic semantics
The negative result of the previous section, the lack of a finite valuation system for the intelim logic, does not prevent the latter, as shown in Section 2.6, from being feasibly decidable. Indeed, it turns out the this tractable logic admits of a non-standard valuation system in which the evaluation of formulas on the basis of a given assignment is non-deterministic.
Let V be a set of truth-values. A non-deterministic valuation over V is a mappingv : F (L) → V such that (i) for every atomic p ∈ F (L),v(p) ∈ V and (ii) for every n-ary operator ⋆ and every formula A ∈ F (L) with ⋆ as main operator, v (⋆(B 1 , . . . , B n ) 
Notice that, unlike standard valuations, non-deterministic valuations are not uniquely determined by an assignment φ to the atomic formulas. In general, for every such assignment φ we have a set V φ of non-deterministic valuationsv such that, for all atomic p,v(p) = φ(p).
Non-deterministic valuations have been intensively studied by Arnon Avron (see [1, 4, 2, 5, 3] among others) and used as a tool for investigating proof-theoretical properties of Gentzen-style sequent calculi. Crawford and Etherington [15] introduced 3-valued non-deterministic valuations as a tool for investigating tractable inference and claimed (without proof) that they provide an adequate semantics for (an extension of) unit resolution. In this section we generalize Crawford and Etherington's semantics and show that this generalization can be justified in terms of the modular semantics of Section 2.2, so building a bridge between the two approaches.
Let 3 be the set of values {0, 1, ⊥}. For every n-ary operator ⋆, letf ⋆ be the function from 3 n to 2 3 defined as follows:
Examples 2.50. The following tables describe the functionsf ∧ ,f ∨ ,f → andf ¬ for the usual Boolean operators:
These are the tables introduced by Crawford and Etherington [15] whose connection with the modular semantics of the previous section is given by (8) .
The following tables describe the non-deterministic functions for exclusive or (⊕), Peirce's arrow (↓), Sheffer's stroke (|) and equivalence (≡), built in accordance with (8):
Definition 2.51. A CE-valuation is a non-deterministic valuationv over 3 satisfying the following condition, for every n-ary
It immediately follows from the above definitions that:
Proposition 2.52. A partial valuation v for L is an information state if and only if v is a CE-valuation.
Therefore: Corollary 2.53. For every Γ , A,
Γ |= 0 A if, and only if, A is verified by all CE-valuations that verify all the formulas in Γ ;
Γ is 0-depth inconsistent if and only if there is no CE-valuation that verifies all the formulas in Γ .
Depth bounded Boolean logics
The content of Section 2 can be summarized by saying that |= 0 is the smallest Tarski consequence relation that is closed under the intelim rules for the logical operators of L. In this section we use |= 0 as a basis for defining several approximation systems for Boolean Logic, i.e., directed sets of consequence relations that indefinitely approximate Boolean logic. Depending on the approximation system, the successors of |= 0 may or may not be Tarski consequence relations.
Virtual information
Information states are valuations in which each module is informationally closed in the sense explained in Section 2.2.
This means that, each module α is closed under all the information that is uniquely determined by the truth-table for the main operator of α. This is the most basic mechanism for extracting implicit information from the data (expressed by a partial valuation). Any ''deeper'' processing of the data must introduce and use information that is not uniquely determined by it. For example, to establish that r is a Boolean consequence of p ∨ q, p → r and q → r, we start with the partial valuation v such that
Given the subformula property of intelim deducibility (Corollary 2.40, see also Corollary 2.43), the only valuation modules of v that are significant for the deduction problem under consideration are those extensionally described by the following diagrams (the links represent the subformula relation):
These valuation modules are all informationally closed: in each of them there is no way of determining the value of some undefined formula from the information explicitly stored in the module. To extract the information that r must be true, we necessarily have to consider possible refinements of v containing information that is not implicitly determined by it. For example, we can consider its possible alternative refinements v 1 and 
⟨q, ⊥⟩ ⟨r, ⊥⟩ It is easy to check that, in both cases, the least valuation (with respect to the ⊑ relation) in which all the relevant modules are informationally closed must verify r. So, we may wish to conclude that the piece of information that r is true is also implicitly contained in v. However, this essentially requires the consideration of refinements of v that contain virtual information, in the above example the information that p is true in v 1 and the information that p is false in v 2 , namely information that is not implicitly contained in the original valuation v.
The unbounded use of virtual information, in the way just explained, turns an information state into a Boolean valuation. A natural way of approximating Boolean valuations, starting from the information states defined in Section 2.2 -which correspond to the basis case in which no virtual information is allowed -consists in imposing an upper bound on the depth at which the nested use of virtual information is allowed. However, as we shall see in the next section, this is by no means sufficient to define an approximation system. Because of the failure of the subformula property for the logics with depth-bounded use of virtual information, we also need to introduce further restrictions on the kind of formulas on which virtual information can be assumed (e.g., atomic formulas) and on the kind of formulas that can be taken into consideration as conclusions of the introduction rules (e.g., subformulas of the initial premisses or of the conclusion to be proven).
Search space and virtual space
A fine-grained control on the manipulation of virtual information involves a good deal of subtleties, both from the proof-theoretical and the semantical viewpoint. In this section we propose a general approach to deal with a variety of approximation strategies that differ from each other on two respects: (i) the delimitation of the search space, namely the set of formulas we are ''interested in'' as potential premisses and conclusions of our inference steps and (ii) the delimitation of the virtual space, namely the subset of the search space consisting of the formulas that we are allowed to use as ''virtual assumptions'' (up to a certain fixed depth). For each deduction problem of the form ''Γ ⊢ A?'' the search space is determined as a function f (Γ ∪{A}) of the set of the formulas occurring in its specification, and the virtual space as a function g(f (Γ ∪{A})) of the search space. In general, the choice of specific functions to yield suitable values of these two parameters for each particular deduction problem is the result of decisions that are conveniently made by the system designer, depending on the intended application. Such decisions affect the deductive power of each given k-depth consequence relation, and so the ''speed'' at which the approximation process converges to full Boolean logic. An important special case is the one in which both f and g are equal to the subformula function sub. 12 In this case, since sub(sub(Γ ∪ {A})) = sub(Γ ∪ {A}) both the search space and the virtual space are equal to the set sub(Γ ∪ {A}) consisting of all the subformulas of the formulas that occur in the definition of the given deduction problem. In what follows we propose a general characterization of the kind of functions that can be properly used to delimit the search space and the virtual space.
Let F be the set of all unary operations f on 2 F (L) such that, for all sets ∆ of L-formulas:
Let also
and
It immediately follows from the above definitions that sub is the only operation of F that is both in F u and in
that is the virtual space is always a subset of the search space. Typical examples of operations in F u are :
• the operation sub;
• the operation F * such that F * (∆) is the set of all formulas of L that can be built up from the atomic formulas that occur in the formulas of ∆;
• the operation c u such that c u (∆) is the set of all A ∈ F * (∆) whose logical complexity (i.e., the number of occurrences of connectives in A) is less than or equal to the logical complexity of some formula in ∆;
is the set of all A ∈ F * (∆) whose logical depth (i.e., the number of alternations of connectives in A) is less than or equal to the logical depth of some formula in ∆.
Typical examples of operations in F d are:
• the constant operation ∅ such that ∅(∆) = ∅;
• the operation at such that at(∆) is the set of all atomic formulas occurring in the formulas in ∆;
is the subset of sub(∆) consisting of the formulas A whose logical complexity (i.e., the number of occurrences of logical operators in A) is no greater than k for some fixed k (so, at = c d 0 );
is the subset of sub(∆) consisting of the formulas A whose logical depth (i.e., the number of alternation of logical operators in A) is no greater than k for some fixed k.
Notice that F is the only constant operation in F u and ∅ is the only constant operation in F d .
Weak depth-bounded consequence relations
The simplest kind of depth-bounded consequence relations can be straightforwardly defined by means of the simple notion of information state introduced in Definition 2.10. 
A.
It follows from Corollary 2.43 that, for every f ∈ F u and every g ∈ F d :
Moreover, it follows from Proposition 2.48 that: .
Moreover, the number of formulas in sub(∆) is bounded above by |∆|.
Let us define
It is not difficult to show that does not, in general, satisfy Cut and so it is not a Tarskian consequence relation.
Strong depth-bounded consequence relations
The characterization of stronger consequence relations that satisfy some form of Cut prompts for a general notion of k-depth information state. is recursively defined as follows:
is the set of all information states over ∆ (see Definition 2.42);
is the set of all information states v over ∆ such that v is closed under the following condition:
is the set of all information states discussed in Section 2.2.
Definition 3.5. For all f ∈ F u and all g ∈ F d , the strong k-depth consequence relation of type ⟨f , g⟩ is the relation k
such that v verifies all the formulas in Γ . (14) Not all strong k-depth consequence relations k ⟨f ,g⟩ are consequence relations in Tarski's sense, for they may or may not satisfy Cut depending on their type. A sufficient condition obtains when the operation f that delimits the search space is the operation F * such that F * (∆) is the set of all formulas that can be built up from the atomic formulas in at(∆):
is a Tarski consequence relation.
In particular, the following instances of k ⟨f ,g⟩ are all Tarski consequence relations:
where f Λ is the operation in F d such that f Λ (∆) = at(∆) ∩ Λ for some fixed set Λ of atomic formulas of the language.
The reader can verify that all these three special cases are consequence relation that satisfy unrestricted cut. However, only the first satisfies Substitution Invariance (is a propositional logic in the sense of Section 2. , which is a Tarski consequence relation.
Although they may not satisfy unrestricted Cut, strong k-depth consequence relations always satisfy the following restricted version of it:
An important special case of Bounded Cut is the one in which f = g = sub, and so
in which case we speak of Analytic Cut. It immediately follows from the above definitions that:
We shall use the notation 
verifies all classical tautologies. It is not difficult to check, using the decision procedure for ⊢ IE , that for any axiom A of any of the standard Hilbert style axiomatic systems for classical propositional logic, ¬A is intelim inconsistent, and so there is no 0-depth information state that falsifies A. It then follows that 1
⟨F,F⟩
A for every such axiom A.
Moreover, 1 
is closed under Modus Ponens (because |= 0 is) and, therefore, every classical tautology is a tautology also for 1
.
Depth-bounded intelim proofs
Given a signed formula X , let Uns(X) denote the unsigned formula A such that X = S A, S ∈ {T , F }. Moreover, given a set of signed formulas, let Uns( ) = {Uns(X) | X ∈ }. X can be represented in the format of a tree whose branches are intelim sequences and virtual information is introduced by a single branching rule of the form: open branches (namely, those that do not contain T A and F A for any sentence A). 13 We now discuss the deducibility relations that correspond to the strong k-depth consequence relations (of each given type). is recursively defined as follows:
Y if and only if there is a finite sequence X 1 , . . . , X n of signed formulas such that X n = Y and, for every A. 13 For unbounded k, this is a proof system for classical propositional logic that enjoys the subformula property. However, by removing the restriction on B in the rule PB this presentation of classical logic allows also for representing proofs that do not have the subformula property. On the connection between the rule PB and the cut rule of Gentzen's sequent calculus, as well as on the advantages of cut-based formalizations of classical logic, see [16, 17, 24, 18] .
Proof Reference. A proof can be adapted from [19] . This paper proves a normalization theorem for a natural deduction system for classical propositional logics that corresponds to ∞ ⟨F,F⟩ , except that unsigned formulas are used instead of signed formulas. The normalization theorem immediately implies that every k-depth proof of type ⟨F, F⟩ can be transformed, for some m ≥ k, into an m-depth proof of type ⟨sub, at⟩ of the same conclusion from the same assumptions. Expand(⟨G, λ⟩);
push all formulas A such that λ(A) = ⊥ into undefined_formulas;
5:
while λ ̸ = ⊤ and undefined_formulas is not empty do 6: pop a formula A from undefined_formulas; let G 1 = Depth-Expand(k − 1, ⟨G, λ 1 ⟩); 10: let G 2 = Depth-Expand(k − 1, ⟨G, λ 2 ⟩);
11:
if λ 1 = ⊤, then 12: set λ = λ 2 ; 13: remove from undefined_formulas the formulas A such that λ(A) ̸ = ⊥;
14:
else 15: if λ 2 = ⊤, then 16: set λ = λ 1 , 17: remove from undefined_formulas the formulas A such that λ(A) ̸ = ⊥;
18:
else 19: set λ(A) = x for all A such that λ 1 (A) = λ 2 (A) 20: remove from undefined_formulas the formulas A such that λ(A) ̸ = ⊥; is tractable. does not enjoy the subformula property. A counterexample is illustrated in Fig. 1 showing a non-analytic 1-depth proof of C from assumptions 1-6 that cannot be transformed into an analytic one without raising the depth of the proof. The proof is not analytic, because A ∨ B is not a subformula either of the assumptions or of the conclusion. Moreover, it can be verified that there is no analytic 1-depth proof. This counterexample shows that , which raises the problem of the tractability and decidability of Tarskian depth-bounded consequence relations, suggesting that they may not be suitable to define approximation systems, even when the use of virtual information is restricted to subformulas of the assumptions or of the conclusion. Despite the failure of the subformula property, we conjecture that the Tarskian consequence relation k ⟨F,sub⟩ is indeed tractable because the size of the search space can be polynomially bounded without loss of deductive power: 
Related work and concluding remarks
In this final section we briefly discuss a cluster of ideas and methods that are most closely related to the semantic and proof-theoretical framework presented here.
KE and KI
Let us consider a propositional language L consisting only of the four standard Boolean operators ∧, ∨, ¬, →. We may restrict our attention to the intelim sequences that contain only applications of the elimination rules of Table 1 , that we may call ''E-sequences''. An eliminative refutation of Γ is a closed elimination sequence for {T B | B ∈ Γ }.
On the other hand, we may also restrict our attention to the intelim sequences that contain only applications of the introduction rules of Γ , that we may call ''I-sequences''. An introductory proof of A from Γ is an introductory sequence for {T B | B ∈ Γ } that contains T A.
Each of these two restricted notions is turned into a complete system for classical propositional logic by adding a single structural rule, corresponding to the classical Principle of Bivalence, that allows us to split a sequence into two branches that are developed in parallel:
A KE-tree for a set of a signed formulas is a tree whose nodes results from applications of the elimination rules of Table 1, starting from the signed formulas in . A KE-refutation of a set Γ of formulas is a closed KE-tree for {T B | B ∈ Γ }, namely one in which all branches are closed, i.e., contain a pair of conjugate signed formulas. KE is a complete refutation system for classical propositional logic and remains complete if the applications of the branching rule PB are restricted to subformulas of the formulas in the initial set .
A KI-tree for a set of a signed formulas is a tree whose nodes results from applications of the introduction rules of Table 1, starting from the signed formulas in . A KI-proof of a A from Γ is a KI-tree for {T B | B ∈ Γ } such that T A occurs in all open branches. KI is a complete proof system for classical propositional logic and remains complete if the applications of the branching rule PB are restricted to atomic formulas occurring either in the assumptions or in the conclusion. Moreover, the applications of the introduction rules can be restricted, without loss of completeness, to subformulas of the assumptions or of the conclusion. The system KE and KI were introduced by Marco Mondadori [41] [42] [43] and their relative complexity was later investigated in [16, 17, 24, 45, 18] , showing that both methods dominate Smullyan's analytic tableaux in terms of the p-simulation relation [13] .
It has been shown [44, 19, 22] that combining KE and KI leads to a sort of ''natural deduction'' system in which the inferential behavior of the logical operators is regulated by introduction and elimination rules that mirror their classical meaning -while Gentzen's original rules are better seen as an explication of their intuitionistic meaning -and satisfy Prawitz's inversion principle. These operational rules require no manipulation of virtual information (no ''discharge'' of provisional assumptions), the latter being governed only by the structural rule PB. Normalization of proofs and subformula property for this system of natural deduction are shown in [19] . Given the presence of the introduction rules, this natural deduction system can be used, indifferently, as a refutation method or as a proof method for classical propositional logic.
In all these tree methods, the operational rules are not branching and the only branching rule is the structural rule PB. It is therefore quite natural to investigate the subsystems that result from limiting the applications of this single structural rule. A suggestion in this sense for the KE system can be found in [24, Prop. 5.6 ]; see also [18, Prop. 46] . KE with restricted bivalence has been more thoroughly investigated in [29] [30] [31] . A similar idea for the natural deduction system that results from combining KE and KI is discussed in [19] . In general, the depth-bounded consequence relations that can be characterized simply by limiting the nested applications of the PB-rule in the combined KE/KI system are the weak k-depth consequence relations discussed in Section 3.2. The relationship between KE, KI and Gentzen-style natural deduction has been recently discussed at length in [39] with special attention to the complexity of proof-search methods.
Stålmarck's method
Stålmarck's method is a patented algorithm for tautology checking that was first described in [49] . The method has proved to be quite useful for several industrial and civil applications involving the efficient verification of critical properties that are typically expressed by means of (complex) Boolean formulas. The main heuristic principles underlying this algorithm are very similar to those underlying the KE/KI approach: perform Boolean inference by means of non-branching operational rules augmented by a single branching rule (closely related to the PB rule of KE and KI), and delay the application of the latter as long as possible. The two research programmes developed independently and in parallel, addressing different communities. Perhaps their connection was partially obscured by the fact that, in its original presentation, Stålmarck's algorithm applied to formulas in implication normal form and was based on rewrite rules whose format was apparently very distant from that of typical inference rules in more conventional proof-theoretical frameworks, such as analytic tableaux or natural deduction. The gap has been bridged in [48, 8] , where the connection with KE and KI, as well as the contrast with Gentzen style calculi, are clearly and explicitly stated. (See also [37, Section 5.4] on the connection between KE/KI and Stålmarck's method).
In essence, the proof-theoretical backbone of Stålmarck's method can be described as a natural deduction system -like the one described in [19, 23] 14 and generalized in Section 2.3 of this paper -combining the elimination rules of KE, the introduction rules of KI and a variant of PB called ''dilemma'' (see [48, Section 3.7] [8, pp. [17] [18] [19] [20] ). Like in KE/KI the latter is the only branching rule and the only one that involves the introduction and subsequent discharge of (complementary) virtual assumptions. Stålmarck's method is a refutation algorithm exploiting the fact that the unbounded system -where the number of nested applications of PB is not limited -enjoys the subformula property (see [19] for a procedure to turn arbitrary proofs into ones that enjoy the subformula property), so that the formulas occurring in the conclusion of the introduction rules and in the PB rule can be restricted to (weak) subformulas of the initial assumptions or of the conclusion. However, the algorithm adds to this proof-theoretical hardcore two kinds of enhancements: branch merging, that allows to unify adjacent branches by deleting all the formulas that do not occur in both of them, and formula relations, recording the fact that two formulas must have the same (unknown) truth value.
If we leave formula relations aside, Stålmarck's algorithm for 0-depth saturation is a procedure for recognizing the intelim inconsistency, in the sense of Definition 2.23, of formulas in implication normal form. It follows from Corollary 2.40 that allowing for unrestricted applications of the introduction rules does not generate any new valid inference and so, given Proposition 2.30, the algorithm is sound and complete for 0-depth inconsistency, defined in terms of the Tarskian consequence relation |= 0 , which is characterized by the modular semantics of Section 2.2 or, alternatively, by the 3-valued non-deterministic semantics of Section 2.9. Proposition 2.49 also applies, to the effect that there is no finite standard valuation system characteristic for Stålmarck's 0-depth procedure (the proof can be adapted for the case of formulas in implication normal form). Stålmarck's k-depth algorithm corresponds to k-depth inconsistency defined in terms of the With the addition of formula relations the situation is less transparent. Although these enhancements may significantly improve the efficiency of the k-depth saturation procedure, for each fixed k, they seem not to fit the ''harmonic'' pattern of introductions and eliminations that is exhibited by the ''pure'' rules (see Lemma 2.32 in this respect), which is likely to affect the very possibility of a well-behaved theory of meaning for the logical operators. So, the semantic characterizations given in this paper do not appear to be easily adaptable to provide similar characterizations for Stålmarck's k-depth saturation. From a theoretical viewpoint, it seems more convenient to investigate the systems based on the pure rules and treat other enhancements as shortcuts for refutations that are more aptly presented in a higher-depth system. In any case, we believe that the proof-theoretical and semantic framework presented here can be useful also to further investigate the properties of Stålmarck's procedures.
